






Incubation of Evil: 
Evil as the Problem of Human Thinking and Praxis
Abstract
This paper discuses phenomena of evil through the works of Hannah Arendt and the crimes 
of the Nazi regime by identifying in our contemporary world a series of problems with evil 
which author analyses and defines as a contribution to a future inquiry into the problem 
of evil as a problem of human praxis. When Arendt writes on evil, she is encountered with 
a trial to one of the biggest Nazi criminals, Adolph Eichmann in Jerusalem; a trial which 
substantially influenced the theories of evil to this day. What it brings into the discourse is for 
the first time fully described evil as a problem of human consciousness, the inner dialogue as 
a contemplative nature of our being in the world. In the context in which Arendt encounters 
evil, it is described as banal, as evil that is done by men without any call to consciousness, 
and also as a deprivation of thought that aims only at mere execution of tasks where evil is 
global, but the sole act is individual. In other words, it is radical evil that happens with full 
assimilation of an individual into the system of production, bureaucratization, and industri­
alization, where mine self (the “I”) is subjected to the will of the process that itself remains 
unknown. In the contemporary situation, on which we will reflect and compare the theories 
of Arendt and her commentators, evil does not happen as assimilation but rather as a dis­
placement from our everyday life. In that context, evil is incubated in the areas of worldly 
conflicts, and it witnesses itself through media representations. They create the topographies 
of evil, and with this creation they deprive us of the duty to think our own actions or to think 
them inside the framework of evil and good because our everyday life is deprived of the 
operators with which we could execute such thought process without falling into a discourse 
of conservative tones of some other form of selective tradition that do not fit the socio­politi­
cal being of the world we live in, the world of technosphere. Evil has its solid foundations 
in metaphysics, and it surely governs the discussion of justice (social mystification of good), 
punishment (justified evil) and others, but that does not mean that evil, begins and ends in 
its categorical immovability out of the world of movable, the physical world. Evil is a fluc­
tuating point of distress inside the freedom which we produced so we could get rid of it. In 
the moment in which we deal with our immediate past, it is necessary to “modernize” the 
thought of evil as a phenomenon that is the inevitable subject of every praxis that hopes to 









































































and	 contemporary	 liberal	 philosophy	 that	 permits	 this	 trivial	 paradox.	The	






























2. The problem of evil as a problem of theory
2.1. Arendt, Eichmann and conscience
Adolf	 Eichmann	was	 abducted	 in	 1962	 in	Argentina	 by	Mossad,	 and	was	
brought	to	trial	in	Jerusalem	for	the	crimes	from	the	time	of	the	Second	World	
War.	Putting	 the	virtual	 spectacle	 aside,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 trial	was	 to	 finally	




the	horror	of	 the	man	standing	 in	 front	of	 the	people	he	 tried	 to	eradicate.	
However,	 theoretical	 consequences	of	 this	 trial,	 consequences	 for	our	con-
temporary	understanding	of	the	problem	of	evil,	are	of	the	utmost	importance.	
This	 paper	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 the	 contemporary	 commentators	 of	Eichmann	
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be	 rhetorically	played	over,	even	 though	 the	 trial	 showed	 its	utmost	weak-
ness	 exactly	 in	 that	 point.	 It	was	 predestined	 for	 a	 structural	 distress	with	
the	testimony	of	the	accused	as	being	an	innocent	bystander.	That	gave	way	
to	 a	 thought	 that	 this	 is	 actually	more	 or	 less	 an	 innocent	man	 tangled	 in	
the	web	of	criminal	organization	of	totalitarian	regime	of	power.	Structural	

























theory	 and	 history	 can	 serve	 as	 fertile	 ground	 for	 contemplation,	 although	


























hate.	Officials	 of	 high	 bureaucratic	 institutions	 of	 the	Reich	 are	 but	 small	


























and	 further),	 consequently	 also	Hösle	 in	The Philosophy of the Ecological 
Crisis (Hösle	1996:73).	They	claim	that	one	of	the	possible	solutions	to	the	
incredible	ease	of	the	elimination	of	another	life	is	in	the	widened	state	of	our	
consciousness of happening.	The	culprit	in	the	era	of	long­distance wars no	
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2.2. Evil and Modernity
“Camps aren’t designed only to exterminate and degrade hu­
man beings, but also to serve as an experiment of the elimina­
tion of spontaneity as a virtue of human behaviour in general 
and the transformation of human nature into the common­
place, into something even different from the animal; because 
for Pavlov’s dogs we know – it was trained to eat when the bell 
rings, not when it’s hungry – it was a perverted animal.”
(Arendt	1951:438)
For	Hanna	Arendt,	the	idea	of	the	dehumanization	of	human	nature	was	crys-






















is	also	an	object	of	aesthetics.	Evil	begins	 to	actively	 live	 in	culture,	 i.e.	 it	
appears	as	its	object.	In	certain	cases,	it	also	becomes	the	aesthetic	object	of	

































That	 is	why	 it	 is	 especially	 important	 to	highlight	 the	violent	whimsies	of	
















2.2.1. The Abolition of Theodicy 
      and the Creation of the Technosphere
The	conduction	of	the	politics	of	cleansing	the	world	in	order	to	establish	it	as	
total	firstly	required	a	system,	a	nexus	of	bureaucracy;	the	preoccupation	with	























































as	a	feature	of	 the	material	body,	 is	 tied	with	evil	because	 it	appears	as	an	
exemption	of	the	being	(Gerson	2006:102,	108)	which	is	in	the	disfavour	of	
our	perishing	bodies.
















D.	 Vuger,	 Incubation	 of	 Evil:	 Evil	 as	 the	
Problem	of	Human	Thinking	and	Praxis59
comes	exotic	and	foreign.	Since	the	premedicinal	mystic	diseases	(the	inner	




































































Every	 incubation	 is	a	political	act	but,	considering	 the	historical,	or	rather,	
temporal	disposition	within	the	context	in	which	it	operates,	incubation	ap-
pears	as	(1)	aesthetic-semantic,	(2)	performative-medial,	and	(3)	philosophi-
cal-metaphysical.	Moreover,	 although	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 offer	 a	 series	 of	 di-





























































or	 intentions	of	 controlling	 evil,	 but	 rather	 the	directed	 cultivation	of	 evil.	

































































that	were	 in	 almost	 immediate	 contact	with	 their	 victims	 couldn’t	 identify	
with	 the	 captives,	 but	 only	 felt	 contempt	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 all	 the	 traits	 that	





ism	 identified,	we	will	point	 to	 the	debate	about	 the	very	nature	of	human	


























of	 the	 previous	 statement).	 The	 category	 of	 political	 responsibility,	 which	
cannot	be	judged	as	a	criminal	action	(Arendt	2006:301)	has	been	thrown	out	
























or	how	to	put	Nazism	on	 trial;	however,	however,	 they	are	wrapped	 into	a	
worldwide	taboo	about	the	attempt	to	reconcile	such	actions	with	neoliberal	
politics	of	our	time.
Thinking	 of	 the	 victims	 of	Auschwitz	 should	 once	more	 remind	 us	 of	 the	
suffering	that	arises	from	this	cruel	manifestation,	and	whose	nature	cannot	
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zlo kao problem čovjekova mišljenja i prakse
Sažetak
Na tragu promišljanja zločina nacizma Hannah Arendt u radu se tematizira odnos fenomena 
zla u suvremenosti u kojoj se identificira niz problema koji mogu poslužiti kao prilog budućem 
istraživanju zla kao problema prakse. Arendt piše o zlu suočena sa suđenjem jednome od najve­
ćih nacističkih zločinaca, Adolfu Eichmannu, koje je do danas bitno utjecalo na teoretiziranje 
zla. Po prvi se puta dosljedno uvodi u raspravu zlo kao problem savjesti, odnosno unutarnjeg 
dijaloga kao kontemplativne naravi našeg djelovanja koja nas čini osobama. Zlo je, u obliku 
s kojim se susreće Arendt, opisano kao banalno, kao zlo koje čini čovjek bez priziva savjesti, 
kao produkt ne-mišljenja. Pritom je riječ o pukom izvršenju operacija gdje je zlo globalno, ali 
sam čin individualan. Takvo zlo može biti opisano i kao radikalno zlo koje se događa potpunom 
asimilacijom pojedinaca u sistem proizvođenja, birokratizacije i industrijalizacije gdje se Ja 
predaje volji procesa koji ostaje nepoznat. Danas se zlo ne događa kao asimilacija, nego se 
izmješta iz svakodnevice. U tomu se horizontu zlo inkubira u mjesta svjetskih sukoba i svjedoči 
o sebi putem medijskih reprezentacija koje sugestivnom politikom stvaraju topografije zla, a 
svojim uspostavljanjem lišavaju nas obveze da svoje vlastite akcije promatramo unutar okosni­
ce zla i dobra jer je svakodnevica lišena operatora s kojima bismo to mogli činiti sa sigurnošću 
da nećemo upasti u diskurs konzervativizma ili drugih selektivnih tradicija koje ne odgovaraju 
konkretnom društveno-političkom bitku tehnosfere u kojoj živimo. Naime, zlo ima svoj čvrst 
temelj u metafizici i svakako je nadležno raspravi o pravednosti (društvenoj mistifikaciji dobra) 
ili kazni (opravdanom zlu), ali to ne znači da zlo počinje i završava u kategoričnoj nepomičnosti 
izvan svijeta pokretnina. Zlo je fluktuirajuća točka nemira unutar slobode koju smo stvorili da 
bismo ga izbjegli. U trenutku kada se razračunavamo sa svojom neposrednom poviješću potreb­
no je osuvremeniti mišljenje o zlu kao fenomenu koji je nezaobilazan predmet svake prakse koja 




Inkubation des Bösen: 
das Böse als Problem des menschlichen Denkens und der Praxis
Zusammenfassung
Auf der Spur von Hannah Arendts Reflexionen über die Verbrechen des Nazismus wird in der 
Arbeit das Verhältnis zum Phänomen des Bösen in der Moderne thematisiert, in welcher eine 
Reihe von Problemen identifiziert wird, die als Beitrag zur zukünftigen Untersuchung des Bösen 
als Problem der Praxis dienen können. Arendt schreibt über das Böse, konfrontiert mit dem 
Gerichtsprozess gegen einen der größten Nazi­Verbrecher, Adolf Eichmann, also dem Prozess, 
der die Theoretisierung des Bösen bis heutzutage belangreich beeinflusst hat. Zum ersten Mal 
wird das Böse konsequent in die Erörterung eingeführt, und zwar als ein Problem des Gewis­
sens bzw. des inneren Dialogs als kontemplative Natur unseres Handelns, die uns zu Personen 
macht. Das Böse wurde in der Form, wie ihr Arendt begegnet, als banal geschildert, als Böses, 
welches der Mensch ohne den Gewissensappell antut, als ein Produkt des Nicht­Denkens. Dabei 
ist die Rede von einer bloßen Ausführung von Operationen, wobei das Böse global und der Akt 
selbst jedoch individuell ist. Ein derartiges Böses lässt sich ebenso als ein radikales Böses be­
schreiben, das durch die vollständige Assimilation von Individuen in das System der Produktion, 
der Bürokratisierung und der Industrialisierung geschieht, wo sich das Ich dem Willen eines un­
bekannt gebliebenen Prozesses ergibt. Heutzutage vollzieht sich das Böse nicht als Assimilation, 
sondern es wird aus dem Alltag ausgelagert. In diesem Horizont inkubiert sich das Böse in den 
Schauplätzen der Weltkonflikte und zeugt von sich selbst anhand der Medienrepräsentationen, 
die mittels suggestiver Politik Topografien des Bösen schaffen und uns durch ihre Etablierung 
von der Verpflichtung entbinden, eigene Handlungen im Rahmen der Grundzüge des Bösen und 
des Guten zu beobachten. Denn der Alltag ist der Operatoren beraubt, mit denen wir dies tun 
könnten, und zwar mit der Sicherheit, nicht auf den Diskurs des Konservativismus oder anderer 
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selektiver Traditionen einzugehen, die nicht dem konkreten gesellschaftspolitischen Sein der 
Technosphäre, in der wir leben, entsprechen. Das Böse, nämlich, hat ein solides Fundament 
in der Metaphysik und ist sicherlich maßgeblich für die Diskussion über die Gerechtigkeit (ge­
sellschaftliche Mystifikation des Guten) oder die Strafe (gerechtfertigtes Böses), allerdings be­
deutet dies nicht, dass das Böse in einer kategorischen Bewegungslosigkeit außerhalb der Welt 
des Bewegten beginnt und endet. Das Böse ist der fluktuierende Punkt der Unruhe innerhalb 
der Freiheit, die wir geschaffen haben, um es zu vermeiden. In dem Augenblick, in welchem 
wir uns mit unserer unmittelbaren Geschichte auseinandersetzen, ist es notwendig, die Idee des 
Bösen als eines Phänomens zu erneuern, das ein unentbehrlicher Gegenstand jeglicher Praxis 





L’incubation du mal : 
le mal en tant que problème de la pensée et de la pratique de l’Homme
Résumé
Sur la trace des réflexions sur les crimes du nazisme de Hannah Arendt, ce travail thématise 
la relation des phénomènes du mal dans le monde contemporain au sein duquel une suite de 
problèmes qui ont été identifiés peuvent servir de contribution aux futures recherches. Arendt 
écrit sur le mal en étant confrontée à l’un des plus grands criminels nazis, Adolf Eichmann, qui 
a jusqu’à présent largement influencé la théorisation du mal. Pour la première fois, le mal est 
introduit dans le débat de manière cohérente comme problème de conscience, à savoir comme 
dialogue interne qui se comprend comme nature contemplative de notre action et qui fait de 
nous des personnes. Le mal est, sous la forme avec laquelle Arendt est confrontée, décrit comme 
banale, comme mal qui définit l’Homme sans faire appel à la conscience, comme un produit de 
la non­pensée. Ensuite, il est question de la simple exécution de l’opération où le mal est global, 
et le fait même individuel. Un tel mal peut être décrit comme un mal radical qui se produit par le 
biais d’une complète assimilation de l’individu au système de production, de bureaucratisation, 
d’industrialisation où le Je s’adonne à la volonté du processus qui reste méconnu. C’est dans 
cette horizon que le mal est incubé dans des lieux de conflits mondiaux et témoigne de lui à 
travers la représentation des médias qui, par une politique suggestive, créent des topographies 
du mal, et qui, par leur constitution, nous privent de l’obligation d’observer nos propres actions 
à l’intérieur de l’axe du mal et du bien car le quotidien est privé d’opérateurs avec lesquels 
nous pourrions effectuer cela de manière sûre, ce qui pourtant nous éviterait de tomber dans le 
discours du conservatisme ou dans d’autres traditions électives qui ne répondent pas à la lutte 
politico­sociale de technosphère dans laquelle nous vivons. En effet, le mal a son fondement fer­
me dans la métaphysique et il est absolument soumis au débats de la justice (à la mystification 
sociale du bien) et à la peine (au mal justifié), mais cela ne signifie pas que le mal commence et 
finit dans une immobilité catégorique au­delà du monde en mouvement. Le mal est une situation 
fluctuante de tourments au sein d’une liberté que nous avons créé afin d’y échapper. À l’instant 
où l’on règle ses comptes avec l’histoire immédiate, il est nécessaire de rendre contemporain la 
pensée sur le mal en tant que phénomène, objet incontournable de chaque pratique qui tend à 
dépasser les injustices concrètes de notre situation spirituelle historico­mondiale.
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